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Abstract
The fundamental proposal in this article is that logi-
cal formulas of the form (f ↔ ¬f) are not contradic-
tions, and that formulas of the form (t↔ t) are not
tautologies. Such formulas, wherever they appear in
mathematics, are instead reason to conclude that f
and t have a third truth value, different from true
and false. These formulas are circular definitions of
f and t. We can interpret the implication formula
(f ↔ ¬f) as a rule, a procedure, to find the truth
value of f on the left side: we just need to find the
truth value of f on the right side. When we use the
rules to ask if f and t are true or false, we need to
keep asking if they are true or false over and over,
forever.
Russell’s paradox and the liar paradox have the
form (f ↔ ¬f). The truth value provides a straight-
forward means of avoiding contradictions in these
problems. One broad consequence is that the tech-
nique of proof by contradiction involving formulas of
the form (f ↔ ¬f) becomes invalid. One such proof
by contradiction is one form of proof that the halt-
ing problem is uncomputable. The truth value also
appears in Cantor’s diagonal argument, Berry’s para-
dox, and the Grelling-Nelson paradox.
1 Introduction
Consider these Prolog rules1:
1For an introduction to Prolog, a logic programming lan-
guage, see Clocksin and Mellish [4].
t :- t.
f :- \+ f.
a(X) :- a(X).
b(X) :- \+ b(X).
elementOf(X, c) :- elementOf(X, X).
elementOf(X, r) :- \+ elementOf(X, X).
The roughly corresponding logical formulas are:
t↔ t (1)
f ↔ ¬f (2)
∀x(A(x) ↔ A(x)) (3)
∀x(B(x) ↔ ¬B(x)) (4)
∀x(x ∈ C ↔ x ∈ x) (5)
∀x(x ∈ R↔ x 6∈ x) (6)
The Prolog predicate “elementOf” is meant to be the
standard “∈” symbol in set theory, and the rules in-
volving “elementOf” are meant to represent Russell’s
paradox.
People familiar with Prolog should recognize
that the program enters infinite recursion when we
run these queries on the command line, with any
constant “z”:
?- t.
?- f.
?- a(z).
?- b(z).
?- elementOf(c, c).
?- elementOf(r, r).
When we use Prolog to ask if the state-
ments t, f, a(z), b(z), elementOf(c, c), and
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elementOf(r, r) are true or false, we keep asking
if they are true or false over and over, infinitely, and
never arrive at an answer of true or false. As part of
the procedure to find the truth value of each state-
ment, we need to find the truth value of the same
statement.
We should call this behavior a “truth value”. Some
statements are true, other statements are false, and
still other statements have the behavior that when we
ask if they are true or false, we keep asking forever.
This sort of infinite recursion is familiar in Prolog,
but we need to account for it in all forms of logic.
We would ideally like Prolog to return an answer of
“recursive” instead of “true” or “false”. Detecting in-
finite recursion in general is the halting problem, but
people have successfully developed algorithms to de-
tect infinite recursion in special cases, as in the field
of termination analysis [1]. There could be an op-
tion for attempting to detect infinite recursion when
running a Prolog program, if it would be too compu-
tationally expensive to check for infinite recursion all
the time.
This truth value is important because it appears
in Russell’s paradox, the liar paradox, the halting
problem, Cantor’s diagonal argument, Berry’s para-
dox, and the Grelling-Nelson paradox. Many of these
problems involve formulas of the form (f ↔ ¬f).
People conventionally take these formulas to be con-
tradictions. What Prolog’s particular resolution-
based theorem proving algorithm says about the
statements in these problems and the above Prolog
statements is that they are not true, are not false,
and are not both true and false at the same time;
they are not contradictions. We should treat these
statements as having the recursive truth value in all
forms of logic. We need to develop a three-valued
logic for this truth value; Fitting [6] provides some of
what is needed.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. First
it is presented how Russell’s paradox has the recur-
sive truth value. Next, it is presented generically how
(t↔ t) and (f ↔ ¬f) are recursive instead of being a
tautology and a contradiction. Afterwards, Tarski’s
Convention T is used to prove that the liar paradox is
recursive. The truth value has consequences for the
technique of proof by contradiction, and one proof
by contradiction that the halting problem is uncom-
putable is analyzed. Finally, Cantor’s diagonal argu-
ment is presented briefly, as well as how some num-
bers have this truth value in the place of some digits.
Berry’s paradox and the Grelling-Nelson paradox [8,
intro] are left for presentation elsewhere.
2 Russell’s Paradox
Russell’s paradox [9] involves the set:
R = {x | x 6∈ x} (7)
R is the set of everything that is not a member of
itself. C is the set of everything that is a member of
itself:
C = {x | x ∈ x} (8)
The above rules for R and C are repeated here:
elementOf(X, c) :- elementOf(X, X).
elementOf(X, r) :- \+ elementOf(X, X).
∀x(x ∈ C ↔ x ∈ x)
∀x(x ∈ R↔ x 6∈ x)
For any x, x is an element of R if and only if x is
not an element of x. We ask if R ∈ R is true or false:
?- elementOf(r, r).
Prolog enters into infinite recursion. In the Prolog
program, we provide a procedure for determining if
an arbitrary entity x is an element of R. In order to
find out if x is an element of R, we need to find out if
x is an element of itself. In order to find out if R is an
element of R, we need to find out if R is an element
of itself.
It is in general desirable for sets to have a decid-
able procedure to determine if any entity is an ele-
ment of the set. For some sets, we can write com-
puter programs to decide membership, as in logic
programming languages like Prolog or in imperative
programming languages. We can provide logical rules
so that we can use theorem proving techniques to de-
cide membership. It happens that in Prolog’s par-
ticular theorem proving algorithm, the equivalent of
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∀x(x ∈ R↔ x 6∈ x) becomes infinitely recursive when
we use the rule to ask if R ∈ R. Prolog interprets the
implication formula as a procedure to determine if
R ∈ R:
R ∈ R↔ R 6∈ R (9)
If we can determine that R 6∈ R, we can conclude
that R ∈ R.
Russell’s paradox is strange when we describe it
informally: We ask if R is an element of R. R is an
element of R if and only if R is not an element of R.
In other words, R is an element of R if it holds that
R is not an element of R, R is an element of R if it
is the case that R is not an element of R, and R is
an element of R on the condition that R is not an
element of R. That means we have to ask: is R an
element of R? Asking if R is an element of R is what
we were doing at the beginning, so we ask again. We
repeat the process of asking if R is an element of R.
When we ask if R ∈ R is true or false, we keep asking
if R ∈ R is true or false over and over, forever.
Is R ∈ R actually true or false, just we do not
know? Prolog’s theorem proving algorithm leads us
to conclude that R ∈ R is neither true nor false.
Instead, it has a different truth value than true or
false, the recursive truth value. Is R actually either
in R or not in R, just we do not know? We can
never say that R is either in the set or not in the set.
Instead, we keep asking forever when we ask if it is
in the set. An entity may be related to a set in a
manner other than being an element of it or not an
element of it.
3 Tautologies and Contradic-
tions
Russell’s paradox has the form of the propositional
logic formula (f ↔ ¬f):
(R ∈ R)↔ ¬(R ∈ R) (10)
elementOf(r, r)↔ ¬elementOf(r, r) (11)
The liar paradox, presented in section 4, also has the
form (f ↔ ¬f): (True(s)↔ ¬True(s)). The corre-
sponding Prolog rule is:
f :- \+ f.
f is true if and only if f is false. f is true if it holds
that f is false; f is true on the condition that f is
false. The Prolog rule provides a means, a procedure,
for finding the truth value of f . In general, if we
want to find the truth value of f , we need to search
the Prolog database to find if there is a fact asserting
f , or if there is a rule with f as its head. We find
the rule “f :- \+ f.”, and we attempt to satisfy the
body of the rule. As part of the procedure to find the
truth value of f , we need to find the truth value of
f . When we ask if f is true or false, we keep asking
repeatedly forever.
In classical two-valued logic, we often interpret an
implication statement (p↔ q) as providing a proce-
dure, a rule, for finding the truth value of p: we just
need to find the truth value of q. This interpreta-
tion of implication is explicit in Prolog. We should
interpret (f ↔ ¬f) as providing a rule for finding the
truth value of f on the left side: we just need to find
the truth value of f on the right side.
If we somehow know that f is either true or false,
the formula (f ↔ ¬f) would force us to conclude that
f has the opposite truth value, which would be a
contradiction. However, if all we have is the formula
(f ↔ ¬f), it is just a rule for finding the truth value
of f : an infinitely recursive rule. f is true if and only
if f is false. So, using this rule, in order to find out
if f is true, we need to find out if f is false.
Also consider the formula (t↔ t) and the Prolog
rule “t :- t.”. As part of the procedure to find the
truth value of t, we need to find the truth value of t.
The set C above has the form (t↔ t):
(C ∈ C)↔ (C ∈ C) (12)
elementOf(c, c)↔ elementOf(c, c) (13)
As part of the procedure to find out if C is an element
of C, we need to find out if C is an element of C.
In classical two-valued logic, (f ↔ ¬f) is a con-
tradiction, and (t↔ t) is a tautology. The proposal
in this article is that we should instead treat these
3
formulas as reason to conclude that f and t have
the recursive truth value. f and t have just a sin-
gle truth value; they are not true, are not false, and
are not both true and false at the same time. We
should treat all formulas with the form (f ↔ ¬f) or
(t↔ t) as being infinitely recursive, such as Russell’s
paradox and the liar paradox.
It makes sense to say that (t↔ t) is a tautology in
that, if we know that t is true, we can conclude that
t is true. On the other hand, if we intend (t↔ t) to
be a rule for finding the truth value of t, as in Prolog,
then we would say that (t↔ t) is not a tautology but
instead says something special about the truth value
of t, that t has the recursive truth value.
Saying that (f ↔ ¬f) is not a contradiction seems
like a bold claim. For one matter, it would invalidate
one form of the technique of proof by contradiction.
We should say that it is still a contradiction if a state-
ment has more than one truth value at the same time,
such as (p∧¬p); proofs by contradiction of that sort
would still be valid. However, proofs by contradiction
that depend on a formula of the form (f ↔ ¬f) being
a contradiction would be invalid. We would need to
sort through all of mathematics to find all the proofs
by contradiction that have this form, and figure out
how to correct the proofs and all the theory built on
top of those proofs. It would be a very large task.
Formulas of the form (f ↔ ¬f) would be legitimate
to have as axioms or theorems in a formal theory, or
as data in a knowledge base, and would not make the
theory or knowledge base inconsistent. That obser-
vation is consequential for the paradoxes. Formulas
of the form (t↔ t) would not be harmless to have in
a theory or knowledge base.
4 The Liar Paradox
It may be evident from what was presented above
that the liar paradox has the recursive truth value.
There is much more that needs to be said about the
liar paradox, which is not included in this article for
space considerations. Let us briefly consider, though,
Tarski’s well-known “Convention T” [10]. He writes:
Let us consider an arbitrary sentence; we
shall replace it by the letter ‘p.’ We form
the name of this sentence and we replace
it by another letter, say ‘X .’ We ask now
what is the logical relation between the two
sentences “X is true” and ‘p.’ It is clear
that from the point of view of our basic con-
ception of truth these sentences are equiva-
lent. In other words, the following equiva-
lence holds:
(T) X is true if, and only if, p.
Tarski provides the example of the sentence “snow is
white”:
The sentence “snow is white” is true if, and
only if, snow is white.
For the liar paradox, let us represent with the let-
ter ‘s’ the sentence “This sentence is not true”, or
equivalently, “Sentence ‘s’ is not true”. Then, by
Convention T: “Sentence ‘s’ is true if, and only if,
sentence ‘s’ is not true.” We can formalize the for-
mula roughly as:
True(s)↔ ¬True(s) (14)
The formula has the form (f ↔ ¬f). “True” is the
truth predicate that asserts that the argument is a
true sentence. What we want to say in connection to
the recursive truth value is that Convention T pro-
vides a bidirectional rule: if we know that p, we can
conclude that X is true; if we know that X is true,
we can conclude that p. The most direct way to find
out if X is true is to find out if p. The most direct
way to find out if the sentence “snow is white” is true
is to find out if snow is white. The most direct way
to find out if sentence ‘s’ is true is to find out if ‘s’ is
not true.
Convention T provides a procedure for finding out
if X is true: we need to find out if p. Using this rule,
in order to find out if ‘s’ is true, we need to find out
if ‘s’ is true. In order to find the truth value of ‘s’, we
need to find out if its claim about reality is correct.
‘s’ thus has the recursive truth value. ‘s’ is true if
it is not true and is not true if it is true; so, when
we ask if ‘s’ is true, we need to ask again repeatedly
forever. We initially do not know the truth value
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of ‘s’. We need some means, some procedure, for
finding its truth value. Convention T provides such
a procedure.
It is similar for “This sentence is true”, which is
true if and only if it is true. If we call that sentence
‘u’, we can write:
True(u)↔ True(u) (15)
which has the form (t↔ t). As part of the process to
find out if ‘u’ is true, we need to find out if ‘u’ is true.
(We would need to consider in more detail elsewhere
the difference between ‘s’ and “This sentence is false”,
but in any case both are infinitely recursive.)
5 The Halting Problem as a
Proof by Contradiction
One notable proof by contradiction with the form
(f ↔ ¬f) is the proof by Davis et al. that the halt-
ing problem is uncomputable [5, ch 4]. Turing’s proof
is a bit different, but Davis et al.’s proof is explicitly
in this form. The authors assume that the halting
problem is computable and then arrive at this for-
mula that they claim is a contradiction:
HALT(y0, y0)↔ ¬ HALT(y0, y0) (16)
They conclude, by a proof by contradiction, that their
assumption that halting problem is computable must
be false.
Equation 16 has the form (f ↔ ¬f). It makes
sense, given how the authors present the halting prob-
lem, to say that HALT(y0, y0) has the recursive truth
value: to say that, in order to find the truth value
of HALT(y0, y0) on the left side, we need to find the
truth value of HALT(y0, y0) on the right side.
It is worth examining in a bit more detail. The au-
thors discuss computability mainly using an impera-
tive programming language they devised, instead of
using Turing machines. HALT() is a computer pro-
gram that takes as its first argument a natural num-
ber x, and as its second argument a natural number y
representing an arbitrary computer program, and is
supposed to decide if the program y running with the
unsigned int P(unsigned int x)
{
A: if (HALT(x, x)) goto A;
return 0;
}
Listing 1: The programP that is problematic for the
halting problem, given in C/C++ syntax. To explain
the code for readers unfamilar with C/C++: The
first “unsigned int” means that the return value
of the program is a natural number. The second
“unsigned int” means that the program takes a
single parameter “x” that is a natural number. “A:”
is a label for the given line. If the HALT(x, x)
procedure call evaluates to “true”, the “goto A”
command causes the program to enter into an infinite
loop, repeatedly executing line A. If the HALT(x, x)
procedure call evaluates to “false”, the program
reaches the “return 0;” command, which halts the
program and returns the answer of 0.
input of x would either halt or run forever (on an ide-
alized computer). HALT() provides a return value of
“true” (or “1”) if program y would halt and “false”
(or “0”) if it would not halt. HALT() is supposed to
compute the function:
HALT(x, y) =


1 if program y running
with input x halts
0 otherwise
(17)
The authors construct a certain program P that
is problematic:
[A] IF HALT(X, X) GOTO A
P translated into C/C++ syntax2 (with which the
reader may be more familiar) is in listing 1. y0 is the
natural number that represents P.
Consider what happens when we run P with the
input of y0, that is when we run P(y0). If, inside
2For an introduction to C, an imperative programming lan-
guage, see Kernighan and Ritchie [7].
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P, the HALT(y0, y0) procedure call returns “true”
(saying P(y0) halts), then P(y0) does not halt.
If the HALT(y0, y0) procedure call returns “false”
(saying P(y0) does not halt), then P(y0) halts.
Thus, as in equation 16:
HALT(y0, y0) ↔ ¬HALT(y0, y0)
What we want to say here about the recursive truth
value is as follows. In order to find out if P(y0)
halts (that is, in order to find the truth value of
HALT(y0, y0)), we need to find the return value of the
HALT(y0, y0) procedure call inside P. That is, in or-
der for us to find the truth value of HALT(y0, y0), we
need the HALT() program to tell us the truth value
of HALT(y0, y0).
In this interpretation, HALT(y0, y0) has the recur-
sive truth value. When we ask if HALT(y0, y0) is true
or false, we – or the HALT() program – need to keep
asking if HALT(y0, y0) is true or false over and over,
forever.
It is simplest to say that Davis et al.’s proof by
contradiction, asserting that the halting problem is
uncomputable, is invalid because equation 16, having
the form (f ↔ ¬f), is not actually a contradiction.
6 Diagonalization and the
Halting Problem
The reader may be able to imagine how the recursive
truth value relates to Cantor’s diagonal argument [3]
and to Turing’s original article on his version of the
halting problem [11]. These topics require more ex-
tended presentation, but we should say a few words
briefly here.
Some numbers have the recursive truth value in the
place of some digits. Say we have written a computer
program to perform the computation of finding the
digits of a real number. For some numbers and for
some digits, when we attempt to find the value of the
digit, we need to attempt again to find the value of
the same digit. The program enters infinite recursion.
When we ask what the value of the digit is, we keep
asking what the value is over and over, forever. For
one example, if we interpret the set in Russell’s para-
dox as a real number, it has an infinitely recursive
digit.
If it is possible to detect infinite recursion, though,
the program can just mark the given digit as having
the recursive truth value, such as with an “r”, and
move on to computing the next digit. For example,
we could write: “0.10r0110...”
There is a number with an infinitely recursive digit
in Turing’s article in section 8, “Application of the
diagonal process”, which is the key section for the
halting problem and the recursive truth value. In
Turing’s article, in order to find the R(K)-th digit
of β′, the machine needs to find the R(K)-th digit
of β′. However, the recursive truth value allows us
to handle such a number. What the machine can
do is simply mark the R(K)-th digit as having the
recursive truth value, such as by printing an “r” on
the tape, and move on to computing the next digit
in β′. In this way, the machine running with its own
program number as input becomes less problematic.
For Cantor’s diagonal argument, it happens that,
when we attempt to include the diagonal and anti-
diagonal real numbers as rows in the matrix, the
numbers acquire an infinitely recursive digit on the
diagonal. A proof requires more extended presen-
tation, but let us just comment on a mathematical
equation that Boolos et al. use to explain diagonal-
ization [2, ch 2]. They assert that this equation is a
contradiction:
sm(m) = 1− sm(m) (18)
sm(m) is supposed to take the value of either 0 or
1. We should treat this equation as being infinitely
recursive instead of as a contradiction: in order to
find the value of sm(m) on the left, we need to find
the value of sm(m) on the right. We define the value
of sm(m) to be 1 if the value of sm(m) is 0, and to
be 0 if the value of sm(m) is 1.
There is a similar equation in Turing’s article in
section 8, which we can rearrange to:
φK(K) = 1− φK(K) (19)
Turing asserts that this equation is a contradiction,
but we should instead treat it as infinitely recursive:
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in order to find the value of φK(K) on the left, we
need to find the value of φK(K) on the right.
7 Conclusion
The reader should hopefully find it plausible, and per-
haps convincing, that it is best to treat (f ↔ ¬f) as
infinitely recursive instead of as a contradiction. It
seems very clear in Prolog that (t↔ t) and (f ↔ ¬f)
lead us to conclude that t and f have the recursive
truth value. It provides a convenient means of avoid-
ing contradictions in the paradoxes, the halting prob-
lem, and diagonalization. This approach to handling
the paradoxes provides an alternative to Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory, type theory, and Tarski’s hier-
archy of languages. We would need to re-work the
foundations of logic and mathematics to include this
truth value.
We can consider how the truth value works in
propositional logic with (t↔ t) and (f ↔ ¬f), be-
fore considering how it works in first-order logic and
other forms of logic. It would be necessary to figure
out for all the proof systems (truth tables, resolution,
tableaux, axiomatic systems, etc.) how to prevent
them from proving that (t↔ t) is a tautology, and
how to prevent them from proving that (f ↔ ¬f) is
a contradiction. It would be necessary to figure out
how to adapt the proof systems so that, when given
(t↔ t) and (f ↔ ¬f) as premises, they prove that t
and f have the recursive truth value.
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